Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
研究一个只有一种未来交易机会是有效的模型，且事后再谈判无法阻止。随着环境变复杂，任何长期合同的结果收敛到不完全合同模型。当描述交易有成本时，不完全合同结果扩展到更广环境。
The paper considers a hold-up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient, and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented. As the environment becomes more complex (n→∞), the outcome under any message-contingent long-term contract converges to that of the "incomplete contracting" model where trade is contractible ex post, but not ex ante. When trades are costly to describe, both ex ante and ex post, the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments.