Dividends and Market Signalling: an Analysis of Corporate Insider Trading
在欧洲市场检验了John和Lang(1991)的多重信号理论，发现投资者对内部人交易信号比股利变化信号更敏感，内部人卖出被视为坏消息，且成熟公司若伴随更多知情内部人卖出，其股利支付会受到惩罚。
Abstract This study tests the multiple‐signal theory of dividends of John and Lang (1991) in the context of a European market. Our evidence shows that investors are more sensitive to insider trading signals than to signalled changes in existing dividends. In effect, the insider sales signal is universally understood as bad news. After controlling for the quality of a firm's investment opportunities, investors are found to penalise dividend outflows by mature firms that exhibit more informed insider sales activity. Finally, we offer an innovative exploration of the role of earnings announcements in market reaction to the dividend signal.