Collusive Equilibrium in the Great Salt Duopoly
利用英国垄断与兼并委员会关于白盐市场的报告数据，检验寡头理论的新发展，发现一次性非合作博弈模型不成立，而Abreu的“简单惩罚准则”能解释市场中的合谋行为，但联合利润最大化解释不被数据支持。
This paper uses data presented in a report of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission on the market for white salt to test the implications of some recent developments in oligopoly theory. The market in question is a homogeneous, price-setting duopoly where firms are subject to capacity constraints. We find that the conclusions of models based on one-shot non-cooperative games do not hold. Collusion in the market is readily explained by the types of threat strategies underlying Abreu's 'simple penal codes.' Possible explanations of the collusive equilibrium in terms of joint profit maximization are not supported by the data. Indeed the explanation of the equilibrium remains an open question. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.