Incentives' Effect in Influenza Vaccination Policy
通过理论流行病学博弈模型和问卷调查，研究了不同激励措施对流感疫苗接种率的影响，发现最优激励金额随病毒传染性降低而增加，且对非老年人群更高，最高可达每人57美元。
In the majority of developed countries, the level of influenza vaccination coverage in all age groups is suboptimal. Hence, the authorities offer different kinds of incentives for people to become vaccinated such as subsidizing immunization or placing immunization centers in malls to make the process more accessible. We built a theoretical epidemiological game model to find the optimal incentive for vaccination and the corresponding expected level of vaccination coverage. The model was supported by survey data from questionnaires about people's perceptions about influenza and the vaccination against it. Results suggest that the optimal magnitude of the incentives should be greater when less contagious seasonal strains of influenza are involved and greater for the nonelderly population rather than the elderly, and should rise as high as $57 per vaccinated individual so that all children between the ages of six months and four years will be vaccinated. This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management.