Insider Trading in Financial Signaling Models
研究经理自愿交易的影响，发现与标准信号模型不同，交易行为对某些公司是好消息、对另一些是坏消息，且会破坏分离均衡，导致经理为获利而采取低效行动，而基于虚拟股票或不可交易期权的薪酬合同能更有效约束这种行为。
ABSTRACT We study the impact of voluntary trade by the manager. We find that, in contrast to standard signaling models, an action is good news for some firms and bad news for others, depending on observable characteristics of the firm, its managers, and their compensation plans. Further, voluntary trade eliminates separating equilibria and thus the possibility of exactly inferring the manager's private information. This may cause the manager to take inefficient actions so as to earn trading profits. Such undesirable behavior can be more effectively constrained by compensation contracts based on phantom shares or nontradeable options instead of large stockholdings.