Market Misvaluation, Managerial Horizon, and Acquisitions
研究管理层视野长短如何影响并购决策，发现短视CEO的并购公告回报更高、更少用股票支付，但长期业绩更差；长视CEO更可能在市场高估时发起并购。
This paper analyzes the impact of managerial horizon on mergers and acquisitions activity. The main predication is that acquiring firms managed by short‐horizon executives have higher abnormal returns at acquisition announcements, less likelihood of using equity to pay for the transactions, and inferior postmerger stock performance in the long run. I construct two proxies for managerial horizon based on the CEO's career concern and compensation scheme, and provide empirical evidence supporting the above prediction. Moreover, I also demonstrate that long‐horizon managers are more likely to initiate acquisitions in response to high stock market valuation.