Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism
研究了当竞拍者对自己的估值存在奈特不确定性且偏好不完整时，维克瑞机制不再具有占优策略，但所有占优策略机制均不适用；在非占优策略下，维克瑞机制的最差社会福利不仅很好，而且基本最优。
We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences.In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant-strategy, and we prove that all dominant-strategy mechanisms are inadequate.However, we also prove that, in undominated strategies, the social welfare produced by the Vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good, but also essentially optimal.