Risk, Wealth, and Sectoral Choice in Rural Credit Markets
建立模型分析发展中国家非正规信贷部门的作用，指出其通过监控借款人降低抵押要求，既服务无法提供抵押的个体，也服务不愿提供抵押的个体，并可能提供部分保险以平滑消费。
Abstract We model the role of the informal credit sector in developing countries. The informational advantage of informal lenders is portrayed as the ability to monitor borrowers. Monitoring reduces the incentive problem and allows for contracts with lower collateral. This enables informal lenders to serve both individuals who cannot post the collateral required by the formal sector and those who are able but do not want to post collateral. The model is consistent with the conventional view of the informal sector as recipient of spillover demand from the formal sector. It also shows that the informal sector may provide partial insurance as the lower collateral requirement implies greater consumption smoothing for borrowers.