Deposits and Relationship Lending
实证检验了拥有利率不敏感存款（核心存款）的银行能否与借款人达成市场利率融资时无法实现的合同安排，发现核心存款占比高的银行在应对宏观信用风险变化时提供了更多的贷款利率平滑，揭示了银行负债与关系型贷款之间的新渠道。
We empirically examine whether access to deposits with inelastic rates (core deposits) permits a bank to make contractual agreements with borrowers that are infeasible if the bank must pay market rates for funds. Such access insulates a bank's costs of funds from exogenous shocks, allowing it to insulate its borrowers against exogenous credit shocks. We find that, controlling for loan market competition, banks funded more heavily with core deposits provide more loan rate smoothing in response to exogenous changes in aggregate credit risk. Thus we provide evidence for a novel channel linking bank liabilities to relationship lending.