The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
建立了静态公理化谈判理论与序贯策略谈判方法之间的关系，通过两个交替出价模型证明当达成协议的动机趋近于零时，完美均衡结果趋近于纳什谈判解，为经济建模中应用该解提供了指导。
This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the bargainers' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiations. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution with utilities that reflect the incentive to settle and with the proper disagreement point chosen. The results provide a guide for the application of the Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling.