OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN GAMES
研究策略互动中模糊性的影响，提出均衡概念EUA，允许玩家对模糊性持乐观态度，并分析模糊性态度变化在策略互补博弈中的比较静态效应。
This article considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations. It extends the existing literature on games with ambiguity‐averse players by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity. We use the CEU model of ambiguity with a class of capacities introduced by Jaffrray and Philippe ( Mathematics of Operations Research 22 (1997), 165–85), which allows us to distinguish ambiguity from ambiguity‐attitude, and propose a new solution concept, equilibrium under ambiguity (EUA), for players who may be characterized by ambiguity‐preference. Applying EUA, we study comparative statics of changes in ambiguity‐attitude in games with strategic complements. This extends work in Eichberger and Kelsey ( Journal of Economic Theory 106 (2002), 436–66) on the effects of increasing ambiguity if players are ambiguity averse.