Reputation, Renegotiation, and the Choice between Bank Loans and Publicly Traded Debt
建模了企业在银行贷款和公开交易债券之间的选择，考虑财务困境时债务重新谈判。银行因声誉动机投入更多资源评估是否清算或重新谈判，从而减少无效清算，但低财务困境概率的企业更倾向选择债券。
We model firms' choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt, allowing for debt renegotiation in the event of financial distress. Entrepreneurs, with private information about their probability of financial distress, borrow from banks (multiperiod players) or issue bonds to implement projects. If a firm is in financial distress, lenders devote a certain amount of resources (unobservable to entrepreneurs) to evaluate whether to liquidate the firm or to renegotiate its debt. We demonstrate that banks' desire to acquire a reputation for making the 'right' renegotiation versus liquidation decision provides them an endogenous incentive to devote a larger amount of resources than bondholders toward such evaluations. In equilibrium, bank loans dominate bonds from the point of view of minimizing inefficient liquidation,. however, firms with a lower probability of financial distress choose bonds over bank loans.