Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies
评估了利用实地实验和自然实验研究知情选民能否改善治理的文献，发现信息能提升选举问责，但低收入民主国家信息匮乏导致低质量政客和身份政治等问题。
This article evaluates a body of recent work that uses field and natural experiments to answer the question of whether informed voters can enforce better governance. A common finding in the literature is that voter behavior is malleable and that information about the political process and politician performance improves electoral accountability. Limited availability of information thus provides one explanation for the persistence of low-quality politicians and the existence of identity politics and electoral malpractices in low-income democracies. Understanding how voters can gain access to credible sources of information and understanding how politicians react to improved information about their performance are promising avenues for future research.