Toward a Theory of Agricultural Insurance
发展了一个农作物保险理论，指出在信息不完美的情况下竞争性保险市场可能不存在，并分析了公共部门直接提供保险的模型，其中农民根据保险合同决定要素使用，保险机构则选择最优合同以最大化总产出价值。
Abstract In this paper we develop a theory of crop insurance. We start by reaffirming the risk‐spreading role of competitive crop insurance markets. It is argued, however, that once the problems of imperfect information are recognized, a competitive crop insurance market may not exist at all. Two candidates present themselves. First is market insurance with the public sector as a source of (costly) information gathering and dissemination, and second, is the direct provision of crop insurance by the public sector. We focus on the latter and develop a model of public insurance as a decentralized plan where the farmer determines factor utilization taking the insurance contract as given. In turn, the insurance agency, taking factor utilization as determined by the farmer, chooses the optimal contract so as to maximize the value of aggregate output in the economy.