A MULTI-TASK PRINCIPAL-AGENT APPROACH TO ORGANIZATIONAL FORM*
研究了企业在职能型组织（按营销、研发等职能划分）与产品型组织（按产品线划分）之间的选择，发现产品型组织因能基于产品线利润考核经理而占优，但职能间贡献不对称或存在跨产品外部性时，职能型组织可能更优。
This paper studies the choice of organizational forms in a multi-task principal-agent model. We compare a functional organization in which the firm is organized into functional departments such as marketing and R&D to a product-based organization in which the firm is organized into product lines. Managers' compensation can be based on noisy measures of product-line profits. Measures of a functional area's contribution to total profits are not available, however. This effect favors the product organization. However, if there are significant asymmetries between functional area contributions to organizational success and cross-product externalities within functions, organizing along functional lines may dominate the product organization. The functional organization can also dominate when a function is characterized by strong externalities while the other is not.