How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory, and Evidence from the FOMC
研究由专家组成的委员会为何倾向于对外隐藏分歧、展现团结，并分析透明度要求如何导致会前私下沟通，以美国联邦公开市场委员会为案例提供证据。
Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision makers. We show that such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world. Also, if such committees are required to become transparent, for example, by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. A large part of the article is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence supporting our theory.