The Incentive Effects of No‐Fault Automobile Insurance
理论结合实证，分析美国各州1968-94年数据，发现无过错汽车保险相比侵权法显著提高了致命事故率，说明其削弱了谨慎驾驶的激励。
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of no‐fault automobile insurance on fatal accident rates. As a mechanism for compensating the victims of automobile accidents, no‐fault insurance has several important advantages over the tort system. However, by restricting access to tort, no‐fault may weaken incentives for careful driving and lead to higher accident rates. We conduct an empirical analysis of automobile accident fatality rates in all U.S. states over the period 1968–94, controlling for the potential endogeneity of no‐fault laws. The results support the hypothesis that no‐fault is significantly associated with higher fatal accident rates than tort.