Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy
研究提出气候俱乐部模式，通过对非参与者施加小规模贸易惩罚，形成稳定且高减排水平的国际联盟，以解决气候合作中的搭便车问题。
Notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic understanding of climate change, it has proven difficult to forge international agreements because of free-riding, as seen in the defunct Kyoto Protocol. This study examines the club as a model for international climate policy. Based on economic theory and empirical modeling, it finds that without sanctions against non-participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement. By contrast, a regime with small trade penalties on non-participants, a Climate Club, can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement.