Ex Post (In) Efficient Negotiation and Breakdown of Trade
通过审计实验发现，合同双方不愿进行敲竹杠，但许多有效再谈判也因害怕被视为攫取剩余而未发生；事前合同更侧重防范违约风险而非敲竹杠，公平规范和声誉担忧支撑了不完全合同下的交易。
This paper examines frictions in contract renegotiation and its implications for allocative efficiency of contracts. Using a novel audit study methodology, we find that contracting parties in general are reluctant to engage in hold up. However, many efficient renegotiations of contracts also do not happen for the fear of being seen as extracting surplus. We also find that ex ante contracts are structured to mitigate losses arising from breach risk rather than hold up. The results also highlight that role of norms of fairness and reputation concerns in sustaining transactions in settings where contracts are primarily incomplete.