The Effect of Private Interests on Regulated Retail and Wholesale Prices
研究了零售竞争与交叉补贴冲突时监管者的行为，发现私人利益影响零售价格结构，尤其偏向农村居民，且联邦高成本普遍服务补贴未降低农村价格反而降低了城市商业价格。
This paper examines how regulators behave in markets when there is a tension between retail competition and cross subsidy. Using retail and wholesale prices from regional Bell operating company territories and price‐cost margins as a proxy for political influence, we find that private interests influence the structure of retail prices, especially favoring rural residential customers. Political influence also extends to wholesale access prices, although the magnitude of its effect is small. Federal high‐cost universal service payments to a state do not reduce prices in that state’s rural areas but instead lower urban business prices.