QUANTIFYING THE LAFFER CURVE ON THE CONTINUED ACTIVITY TAX IN A DYNASTIC FRAMEWORK*
研究延迟退休的税收激励与社会保障赤字之间的权衡，通过拉弗曲线量化最优税率，发现即使以福利最大化为目标，对延迟退休征税仍应为正。
It is argued that the tax on continued activity should be removed by implementing actuarially fair schemes. However, these schemes cannot fund the expected Social Security (SS) deficit. This article proposes to give individuals a fraction of the actuarially fair incentives in the case of postponed retirement. SS faces a trade‐off between giving enough incentives to make individuals delay retirement and giving little increase in pensions in order to help finance its expected deficit. This trade‐off is captured by a Laffer curve. Finally, when the SS system aims to maximize welfare, the optimal tax on postponed retirement is still strictly positive.