Renegotiation Policies in Sovereign Defaults
研究了一个仁慈的计划者设计的最优重新谈判协议，当两个国家与同一个贷款人重新谈判时，该协议通过独立处理每个国家的违约与偿还权衡，防止债务危机传染。
This paper studies an optimal renegotiation protocol designed by a benevolent planner when two countries renegotiate with the same lender. The solution calls for recoveries that induce each country to default or repay, trading off the deadweight costs and the redistribution benefits of default independently of the other country. This outcome contrasts with a decentralized bargaining solution where default in one country increases the likelihood of default in the second country because recoveries are lower when both countries renegotiate. The paper suggests that policies geared at designing renegotiation processes that treat countries in isolation can prevent contagion of debt crises.