A Re‐Examination of the Wealth Expropriation Hypothesis: The Case of Captive Finance Subsidiaries
重新检验了附属金融子公司设立是否导致财富侵占，发现股东获利14.9%、债券持有人损失2.3%、公司价值上升10.4%，结果不支持财富侵占假说，而支持声誉的重要性。
ABSTRACT This paper re‐examines Kim, McConnell, and Greenwood's (1977) study of captive finance subsidiaries. We suggest that, as long as firms are concerned with reputation, shareholders will find it costly to engage in deliberate wealth expropriation and thus have no incentives to do so. Using a sample of fourteen firms with publicly traded debt, we compute and test the statistical significance of abnormal returns to shareholders, bondholders, and the firm when captives are incorporated. We find that shareholders gain 14.9 percent, bondholders lose 2.3 percent, and firm value increases a significant 10.4 percent. Our results are inconsistent with wealth expropriation and lend support to the importance of reputation to firms.