Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining
研究在随机顺序值（如夏普利值）求解的合作博弈中，三种整合方式的盈利性：合谋可分解为排斥与包容，并通过特征函数的第三差分条件判断合谋是否有利。
This paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random-order value (e.g. the Shapley value). Collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them, say i. This contract can be represented as a combination of exclusion, which lets i exclude j’s resource but not use it himself, and inclusion, which lets i use j’s resource but not exclude j from it. This representation yields a third-difference condition on the characteristic function that determines the profitability of collusion, generalizing existing results for specific games. Namely, collusion is profitable [unprofitable] when the complementarity of the colluding players is reduced [increased] by other players.