Contradiction as a Form of Contractual Incompleteness
用一个简单模型说明，当合同有复杂度限制时，故意加入矛盾指令可能是有利的，因为这把解释任务留给了他人；最优矛盾数量取决于复杂度、利益冲突和制度约束。
A simple model is presented, in which contradictory instructions \nare viewed as a type of contract incompleteness. The model provides \na complexity-based rationale for contradictory instructions. If there \nare complexity bounds on the contract, there may be an incentive to \nintroduce contradictions, leaving for another agent the task of interpreting them. The optimal amount of contradictions depends on the \ncomplexity bound, the conflict of interests with the interpreter, and \nthe institutional constraints on his interpretations. In particular, a \nhigher complexity bound may result in a larger amount of contradictions.