Serial dictatorship: The unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
研究了在代理人可以内生获取信息（如家长为孩子选校、医生为患者配肾）的房屋分配问题中，发现序列独裁是唯一满足事前帕累托最优、策略证明和非霸道性质的分配机制，这与无内生信息时的众多机制形成鲜明对比。
The study of matching problems typically assumes that agents precisely know their preferences over the goods to be assigned. Within applied contexts, this assumption stands out as particularly counterfactual. Parents typically do invest a large amount of time and resources to find the best school for their children; doctors run costly tests to establish the best kidney for a given patient. In this paper I introduce the assumption of endogenous information acquisition into otherwise standard house allocation problems. I find that there is a unique ex-ante Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof and non-bossy allocation mechanism: serial dictatorship. This stands in sharp contrast to the very large set of such mechanisms for house allocation problems without endogenous information acquisition.