A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion
用贝叶斯方法解释埃尔斯伯格悖论，说明风险厌恶的决策者若将问题视为多个正相关问题的组合，就会表现出不确定性厌恶，并推导了不确定性厌恶的充分条件。
The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that people's beliefs over uncertain events might not be representable by subjective probability. We show that if a risk averse decision maker, who has a well defined Bayesian prior, perceives an Ellsberg type decision problem as possibly composed of a bundle of several positively correlated problems, she will be uncertainty averse. We generalize this argument and derive sufficient conditions for uncertainty aversion. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.