换岗:公司财务重述后的高管与董事离职

A Changing of the Guard: Executive and Director Turnover Following Corporate Financial Restatements

ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL · 2006
被引 558
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究发现,发生重大财务重述的公司中,CEO和CFO离职的可能性是匹配样本的两倍以上,董事和审计委员会成员离职可能性高出约70%,表明财务重述对组织合法性构成严重威胁。

Abstract

Using event history analysis, we found that CEOs and CFOs of firms filing a material financial restatement were more than twice as likely to exit their firms as their counterparts in a matched sample. Directors and audit committee members were approximately 70 percent more likely to exit in restatement firms. The magnitude, ubiquity, and temporal proximity of executive and director turnover following a restatement indicate that such events pose a serious threat to organizational legitimacy, independent of firm performance. Restatements therefore provide an important and unique context for studying the accountability of strategic leaders for organizational crises.

公司治理财务重述高管离职组织合法性问责制