Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity
研究了金融危机中政府如何权衡信息披露与财政兜底，揭示信息可减少信贷市场逆向选择但可能引发低效挤兑，财政实力强的政府更倾向于进行信息性压力测试而非直接救助。
We characterize the optimal use of information disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises. In our model, financial crises force governments to choose between runs and lemons. Revealing information about banks’ assets reduces adverse selection in credit markets, but it can also create inefficient runs on weak banks. A fiscal backstop mitigates this risk and allows the government to pursue a high disclosure strategy. A government with a strong fiscal position is more likely to run informative stress tests than a government with a weak fiscal position. As a result, such a government is also less likely to rely on outright bailouts.