A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements
提出贸易协定不仅为应对贸易条件外部性，还源于政府向国内游说团体承诺的动机，预测资本流动性越高、政府政治动机越强时贸易自由化越深入，并解释了关税上限的使用及关税分阶段削减的模式。
We present a model where trade agreements are motivated by the desire of governments to commit vis-à-vis domestic lobbies, in addition to standard terms-of-trade externalities. The model predicts that trade liberalization is deeper when capital is more mobile across sectors, and when governments are more politically motivated (provided domestic-commitment motives are strong enough). The model also provides a new rationale for the use of tariff ceilings. In a fully dynamic specification of the model, tariffs are reduced in two stages: an immediate cut and a subsequent gradual reduction, with the speed of liberalization increasing in the degree of capital mobility.