Policy-Delegation and Fixed Exchange Rates
构建一个重复货币政策博弈模型，分析固定汇率作为政策委托工具如何为高通胀和低通胀国家带来可信度收益，并说明随机调整汇率可维持不同通胀趋势而不损害委托收益。
Recent literature interpreting the European Monetary System emphasizes credibility gains from delegating monetary policy to a low-inflation country through fixed exchange rates. This paper presents a model of an exchange rate system as a device for policy delegation in the context of a repeated monetary policy game. In contrast to single-shot games, it generates credibility gains for the high-inflation and low-inflation countries in the system. Credibility gains neither require nor imply hegemony of the low-inflation member. Stochastic realignments enable the members to adopt different inflation trends without destroying the credibility benefits from policy delegation. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.