Corporate Income Tax Evasion and Managerial Preferences
研究管理层偏好如何影响公司所得税逃税，发现由曾少报个人所得税的高管管理的公司，其逃税概率和逃税金额显著更高。
This paper investigates the role of managerial preferences in shaping corporate income tax evasion. Using noncompliance with the personal income tax as a measure of taste for evasion, the empirical results from a sample of corporate income tax returns show that managerial preferences play an important role in determining noncompliance with the corporate income tax. Basic sample tabulations show that, when compared to compliant firms, noncompliant firms are three times more likely to be managed by executives who have understated personal taxes. In addition, results from multivariate analyses suggest that the amount of underreported income is significantly higher in the presence of such executives. © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology