CEO and director turnover in failing firms: An illusion of change?
研究了濒临破产企业在破产前5年的CEO和董事更替情况，发现尽管更换频繁，但并未遵循改革倡导者和机构投资者所推崇的治理变革模式。
Abstract Firms facing imminent bankruptcy would seemingly be under some pressure to demonstrate effective governance structures as a means for maintaining the support of important external constituents and initiating a turnaround. Little is known, however, about CEO and director turnover and its impact on the composition and structure of the board in failing firms. This study assesses both the incidence and form of governance changes in the 5‐year period prior to corporate bankruptcy. Despite extensive board member and CEO replacements. changes by firms at imminent risk of failure do not conform with the prescriptions favored by reform advocates and institutional investors.