Mandatory Disclosure, Generation of Decision‐Relevant Information, and Market Entry
研究了强制披露政策如何影响企业收集内部信息的动机，以及这种信息生成行为如何通过影响竞争对手的市场进入决策来改变竞争格局。
Abstract We investigate the interaction of mandatory disclosure and the gathering of decision‐relevant information in a setting in which a competitor may enter the market. Gathering detailed information allows for an efficient allocation of resources, but eventually attracts competition by revealing beneficial information to competitors. In contrast, refraining from generating detailed information implies inefficient decisions, but eventually prevents competitors from entering the market. Our results show that an incentive not to generate internal information arises for two reasons: If the incumbent's cost advantage is sufficiently large, disclosing aggregated information can be an instrument to avoid competition by reducing the likelihood of market entry. If the incumbent's cost advantage is small, disclosing aggregated information attracts competition by increasing the likelihood of market entry. In this case, imprecise cost information serves as a commitment device to reduce the intensity of competition by forcing the competitor to take into account his efficiency disadvantage in making his production decision.