IMPERFECT MONITORING AND THE DISCOUNTING OF INSIDE MONEY*
在随机匹配模型中评估了要求私人发行者按面值赎回内部货币的效率，发现当监督不完善时，按面值赎回反而比折价赎回的社会福利更低。
This article evaluates the efficiency of a requirement that private issuers redeem inside money on demand at par in a random‐matching model of money where the issuers of inside money are imperfectly monitored. I find that for sufficiently imperfect monitoring, a par redemption requirement leads to lower social welfare than if private money were redeemed at a discount. A central message of the article is that if inside money and outside money are not perfect substitutes, a par redemption requirement may not be socially optimal because such a requirement effectively binds them to circulate as if they are.