Monetary Commitment and Fiscal Discretion: The Optimal Policy Mix
研究了一个货币与财政的非合作博弈，其中只有货币当局能承诺未来行动。均衡结果取决于央行可用的策略：若策略不受限，央行可引导财政复制完全承诺解；若央行无法承诺对财政政策做出反应，财政支出波动会破坏央行的稳定目标。
We study a noncooperative policy game between monetary and fiscal policy, where only monetary policy can commit to future actions. The equilibrium outcome of the game depends on the strategies available to the monetary policymaker. If strategies are left unrestricted, the central bank can alter the incentives of the fiscal authority in a way that replicates the full commitment solution. If the central bank cannot commit to respond to fiscal policy, the fiscal authority generates fluctuations in government expenditure that undermine the stabilization goals of the central bank.