Evaluating Conservation Auctions with Unknown Bidder Costs: The Scottish Fishing Vessel Decommissioning Program
利用苏格兰两次渔船报废拍卖的实地数据，比较歧视性定价与统一定价两种拍卖方式的成本效益，发现结果模棱两可，并提出了估计竞标者成本的新方法。
As an alternative to the more traditional fixed-price schemes, governments can run auctions to purchase environmental services from private agents. Governments have so far chosen the discriminatory price (DP) over the uniform price (UP) format. Theoretical and experimental studies have concluded that the DP usually performs better than the UP in terms of cost-effectiveness. Using field data from two fishing vessel decommissioning auctions in Scotland, we find ambiguous results regarding relative DP and UP performances. A novel approach for estimating the underlying bidder costs shows that bid shading and cost heterogeneity can each determine relative auction performance. <i></i>