Who Gets the Job Referral? Evidence from a Social Networks Experiment
通过印度加尔各答的实验室实验，研究社交网络如何选择工作推荐对象，发现高能力工人能提供有用信息，但网络激励可能推荐资质较差的工人，企业需平衡激励以有效利用员工推荐。
We use recruitment into a laboratory experiment in Kolkata, India to analyze how social networks select individuals for jobs. The experiment allows subjects to refer actual network members for casual jobs as experimental subjects under exogenously varied incentive contracts. We provide evidence that some workers, those who are high ability, have useful information about the abilities of members of their social network. However, the experiment also shows that social networks provide incentives to refer less qualified workers, and firms must counterbalance these incentives in order to effectively use existing employees to help overcome their screening problem.