Sooner or Later: An Analysis of the Delays in Insider Trading Reporting
分析德国公司内幕交易报告延迟的系统性原因，发现所有权分散和使用德国会计标准的公司延迟更长，且延迟不影响报告后的异常回报，表明延迟期间价格被扭曲，支持强制即时披露的监管。
Abstract: Until October 2004, corporate insiders in Germany were required to report trades in the shares of their firm ‘without delay’. Yet in practice, substantial reporting delays were common. We show that the delays are related systematically to the characteristics of the firm. Delays are longer in firms with dispersed ownership and in firms using German accounting standards. This suggests that managers of these firms are less responsive to the informational requirements of the capital market. We further find that abnormal returns after the reporting date of an insider trade are independent of the reporting delay. This implies that prices are distorted in the period between the insider trading and the reporting date. This is a strong point in favour of regulations that require and enforce the immediate disclosure of insider trades.