Inducing Innovation in the Environmental Technology of Oligopolistic Firms
研究了如何设计环境规制政策，促使污染型伯川德竞争企业高效投资于环境研发，发现将排放税与基于技术披露的环境绩效标准结合可实现最优，并讨论了汽车燃料规制的启示。
This paper characterizes environmental regulations which induce polluting Bertrand competitors to invest efficiently in environmental R&D. Post–innovation benefits to raising rivals’ costs provide firms with incentives to innovate. Although optimal behavior cannot be elicited with pollution taxes alone, an optimum can be achieved by combining emission taxes with environmental performance standards that are higher for firms which reveal superior environmental technologies. Faced with this policy, successful innovators voluntarily reveal their technological discovery to the government, despite the apparent regulatory penalty that results. Implications for automotive fuel regulation are discussed.