Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration
研究了一个动态立法谈判模型，其中默认政策会内生演变，议程设置者持续存在。模型证明在有限政策空间下存在纯策略稳态均衡，并发现重新考虑的可能性会限制提案权价值、促使选民相互保护利益，但能提升政策效率。
We present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving default policy and a persistent agenda setter. Policy making proceeds until the agenda setter can no longer pass a new policy to replace an approved bill. We prove existence and necessary conditions of pure-strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space, any number of players, and any preference profile. In equilibrium, the value of proposal power is limited compared to the case that disallows reconsideration, as voters are induced to protect each other's benefits to maintain their future bargaining positions. The agenda setter, in turn, would prefer to limit his ability to reconsider. The lack of commitment due to the possibility of reconsideration, however, enhances policy efficiency. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.