Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short‐term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly
研究在法律执行成本高或效果差时，如何通过短期债务和债权人之间的外部性来促使贷款人执行合同，并探讨高执行成本对事前激励的影响以及“内部纾困”政策的潜在好处。
ABSTRACT In legal systems with expensive or ineffective contract enforcement, it is difficult to induce lenders to enforce debt contracts. If lenders do not enforce, borrowers will have incentives to misbehave. Lenders have incentives to enforce given bad news when debt is short‐term and subject to runs caused by externalities across lenders. Lenders will not undo these externalities by negotiation. The required number of lenders increases with enforcement costs. A very high enforcement cost can exceed the ex ante incentive benefit of enforcement. Removing lenders' right to immediately enforce their debt with a “bail‐in” can improve the ex ante incentives of borrowers.