Oligopsonistic Landlords, Segmented Labor Markets, and the Persistence of Tied‐Labor Contracts
研究农业经济中因地主市场势力和产出不确定性而持续存在的绑定劳动契约，发现分割劳动力市场中的绑定契约和淡季非自愿失业优于保证全年充分就业的雇佣安排，并分析了不同补贴政策对劳动者福利的影响。
Abstract This article examines contractual labor arrangements in agrarian economies that persist as a consequence of market power on the part of landlords faced with output uncertainty. We show that a segmented labor market characterized by tied‐labor contracts and involuntary unemployment in the lean season are optimal as compared to a labor hiring arrangement that guarantees full employment of labor in both seasons. Government intervention in the form of a specific subsidy targeted toward the hiring of permanent laborers may raise the welfare of all laborers while a specific subsidy directed toward the hiring of casual laborers or the institution of relief programs that absorb the rural unemployed in the lean season leads to the casual laborers in the economy being worse off.