Replacing Trust with Control: A Field Test of Motivation Crowd Out Theory
在瑞典非营利组织中进行随机政策实验，用加强监控取代信任合同，发现此举提高了服务覆盖面、降低了支出并减少了财务违规。
Results in behavioural economics suggest that material incentives can crowd out motivation if agents are mission‐oriented rather than self‐interested. We test this prediction on a sample of non‐profit organisations in Sweden. Traditionally, contracts with the main principal (the Swedish foreign aid agency) have been based on trust and self‐regulation. We designed a randomised policy experiment, effectively replacing the trust‐based contract with an increased level of monitoring from the principal. Overall, using both self‐reported and observed measures of outreach, we find that the intervention increased outreach, reduced expenditures and reduced the number of financial irregularities.