Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution
提出两种简单机制来实现污染的有效配置，分别假设企业间信息完全和不完全，通过激励企业相互监督并利用报告决定污染配额和转移支付，可修改为预算平衡。
We provide simple mechanisms to implement the efficient allocation of pollution, first assuming complete information across firms and then allowing for incomplete information. Both mechanisms operate by inducing firms to monitor one another, using firms' reports to determine pollution allotments and transfers. The complete information mechanism determines a firm's transfer according to a linear pollution price, set by other firms. Both mechanisms can be modified to be budget-balanced, in and out of equilibrium. The complete information mechanism implements the efficient allocation even when firms are allowed to use mixed strategies. Under a single-crossing condition, the same holds for the incomplete information mechanism.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)