CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives and the Cost of Equity Capital
研究发现高管财富对股价的敏感度（delta）会降低隐含股权资本成本，而对波动率的敏感度（vega）则会提高该成本，表明股东会将高管薪酬中蕴含的风险定价到股权资本成本中。
Abstract In this paper, we show that the sensitivities of an executive's wealth to changes in stock prices ( deltas ) decrease the implied cost of equity capital while the sensitivities of an executive's wealth to changes in stock volatility ( vegas ) increase the implied cost of equity capital. Our findings demonstrate that shareholders understand the risks of firms’ future projects as embedded in executive compensation and price these risks into the cost of equity capital accordingly. The findings have strong implications for optimal executive compensation contract design, project evaluation and cost of capital estimation.