Pricing and Lead Time Decisions in Decentralized Supply Chains
研究一个供应商和一个零售商组成的分散式供应链中，面对价格和交货期敏感需求时的定价与交货期决策，发现分散决策因双重边际效应而效率低下，但运营因素占主导时效率损失不显著。
This paper studies a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer facing price- and lead-time-sensitive demands. A Stackelberg game is constructed to analyze the price and lead time decisions by the supplier as the leader and the retailer as the follower. The equilibrium strategies of the two players are obtained. Using the performance of the corresponding centralized system as a benchmark, we show that decentralized decisions in general are inefficient and lead to inferior performance due to the double marginalization effect. However, further analysis shows that the decision inefficiency is strongly influenced by market and operational factors, and if the operational factors are dominating, it may not be significant. This shows that before pursuing a coordination strategy with retailers, a supplier should first improve his or her own internal operations.