The Shoe That Didn't Drop: Explaining Banking Stability During the Great Depression
研究了英国、加拿大等12国在大萧条期间银行业异常稳定的原因，利用25国数据发现宏观经济政策（尤其是汇率政策）和银行结构是主因，而非最后贷款人行为。
This article attempts to account for the exceptional stability exhibited by the banking systems of Britain, Canada, and ten other countries during the Great Depression. It considers three possible explanations of stability—the structure of the commercial banking system, macroeconomic policy and performance, and lender of last resort behavior—employing data from 25 countries across Europe and North America. The results suggest that macroeconomic policy—especially exchange-rate policy—and banking structure, but not lenders of last resort, were systematically responsible for banking stability.