Incentive systems for food quality control with repeated deliveries: Salmonella control in pork production
通过动态委托代理模型分析沙门氏菌控制的激励体系，评估两种动态激励方案在不同所有权结构下的效率，发现基于生产历史降低检测概率的方案更优。
This paper presents a dynamic principal-agent analysis of incentive systems for Salmonella control. The European Union will require Salmonella testing from 2008. On the basis of the producer's performance history in controlling Salmonella, the incentive systems analysed determine quality premiums to the producer, testing frequencies for hogs delivered, as well as charges to the producer for testing and penalties. Using cost estimates and technical parameters, we evaluate two dynamic incentive systems. We also assess the impact of ownership structure on performance. The more efficient incentive system economises on testing costs by reducing the probability of testing in response to a favourable production history and is preferred under all ownership structures.