The Economics of Roscas and Intrahousehold Resource Allocation
研究肯尼亚贫民窟中女性为何参与轮转储蓄与信贷协会（roscas），发现这是妻子为保护储蓄不被丈夫要求立即消费而采取的策略，并用数据验证了模型。
This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas).Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income. To explain this phenomenon, we propose an argument based on conflictual interactions within the household.Participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption.The empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in Kenya.